

## Political Governance Technologies to Overcome Economic Crises

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### ABSTRACT

The article discusses the modern ways of using political management technologies to overcome economic crises. The general characteristics and peculiarities of the emergence of crisis situations in the conditions of the cyclical development of the state are given, the main approaches to both the perception of crisis situations and their use for the benefit of society are determined.

As a methodology for solving the problem of overcoming the crisis, the article proposes a methodology for the formation and operation of political network alliances, as the quintessence of political and economic mechanisms of governance in modern democratic states.

Issues related to the goals and objectives of forming such alliances, tools available to them, methods of work and available powers are considered. The reasons that serve as a catalyst for the creation of such partnerships and their functioning both at the state and municipal levels are highlighted and substantiated.

**Keywords:** Alliance, Economic Crises, Lobbyists, Political Governance.

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## **1. Introduction.**

The centuries-old history of the development of our civilization testifies to the fact that throughout the entire path of the formation of modern society, humanity has invariably been accompanied by crises of a different nature, causes and consequences. With the development of scientific and technological progress and the formation of modern society, a significant part of the crises began to be based on a social and economic nature (Apple, 2017; Kloba and Kloba, 2020).

Modern market relations, on which the entire world economy is based, have also generated economic cycles in which systemic crises have taken a firm place. It would be wrong to assume that a crisis is a negative phenomenon of a spontaneous nature an economic crisis as part of a cycle is a certainty that occurs after periods of stable existence of an economic system (or when the direction of its development changes).

This phenomenon is the engine of the transition to a new level of development of technology, and, as a consequence, other components of civilization (Dzwigol et al., 2020).

Even though in many cases, the analysis of the economic situation makes it possible to predict possible negative phenomena, often the states are unprepared for them.

The reason for this can be called the perception and response to economic crises from a purely financial and economic point of view while excluding their political aspect. At the same time, it should be remembered that the functions of public administration are based on three fundamental approaches that implement the basic principles: legal, political, and managerial (Borodin, 2014; Ahmad, Nilwana, Ramadhan, 2020; Bouckaert, 2020). For more details on their relationship, see Fig. 1.

The central values realized through the approaches of public administration are efficiency, economy, efficiency and social responsibility. To achieve them, the institutions of public administration must follow the principles: the rule of law, representation of the will of the people, the achievement of socio-economic results.


This approach to the perception of economic crises cannot be considered correct, since it is precisely the technologies of political management that underlie the construction of a brilliant strategy for countering crisis processes; moreover, taking into account potential economic risks when determining managerial influences in the political sphere is a useful tool for preventing the large-scale escalation of negative trends in political and economic space.

## **2. Literature Review.**

The theoretical understanding of the problems of organizing political governance has become the subject of research in the scientific works of many authors. The classic idea of "management models" was formed in the framework of the discussion that unfolded in the second half of the 20th century and is ongoing. Of the variety of works on this issue, the concepts of Wilson (1987), Masaharu (2003), Bertucci and Alberti (2005), Levin (2009), Burns (2012), Casini (2012) should be distinguished. The works of Henisz and Zelner (2002), Cooper (2003), Capano et al. (2012), Schendelen (2012) are devoted to the analysis of modern trends in the field of political governance and its technological structure. The problem of political governance is also represented in Ukrainian political science (Borodin, 2014; Kotlyar and Smyrnova, 2020).

Among the researchers who made the most significant contribution to the development of the theory of the systemic nature of economic crises, including from a political point of view, we note the developers of the theory of cycles (Juglar, 1862; Kitchin, 1923; Kondrat'ev and Yakovets, 2002) and their modern followers (Almunia, 2010).

**Figure 1.** Core approaches and values of public administration



Source: compiled by the authors

In considering the practical aspects of the impact of crisis phenomena on the technology of political management, the authors analyzed the publications of the following scholars:

- on the problem of the distribution of managerial powers between levels of government and the formation of the main configurations of the multilevel management system, both of the founder (Marks, 1993) and followers (Blankart and Kleiber, 2006; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum, 2007; Stein and Turkewitsch, 2008; Bird, 2010; Danielsson, 2020);
- on the issues of innovative use of economic instruments of socio-political stabilization (non-fiscal) during periods of systemic crises (Wlezien and Soroka, 2003; Koppel, 2007; Chang, 2012; McCleary and Aspiranti, 2020);
- on the development of international integration processes and technologies for the participation of states in them (Frieden, 2009; Varsori, 2009; Emmers, 2010; Hacker, 2011; Corbo, 2013).

Thus, the bibliographic base of the study is made up of research by specialists in the field of political management, analytical materials from Ukrainian and foreign research organizations, as well as publications in periodicals.

### 3. Methodology.

Speaking about economic crises, in the context of the political environment and technologies, it is worth noting that often the absence of crisis planning in the development of a political development strategy acts as an additional catalyst for the aggravation of crises, their suddenness and severity of consequences. In those countries where the political environment is based on an electoral system, the ruling elites give preference to operational measures to counteract problems in the economy,


practically not using long-term planning methods, which is associated with their desire to ensure a positive image for themselves and maintain the level of electoral support within the electoral cycle.

### 3.1 Economic crises as an integral part of the modern economy.

As mentioned above, the very existence of socio-economic systems is a cyclical process characterized by the regularity of the onset and resolution of crises. Regarding the issue of the systematic nature of economic crises, here one should understand the scale and interconnection of the emergence of several crisis processes a crisis in one area can provoke the possibility of the collapse of the entire system of political and economic relations.

The essence of the cyclical nature of crisis processes is clearly demonstrated in Fig. 2.

**Figure 2.** Periods of economic cycles and the place of crises in them



Source: compiled by the authors

With the cyclical development of the financial system, four key phases should be distinguished (Karyy, Podvalna, 2016; Ayrapetyan, 2019):

1) recession (recession); 2) bottom (depression); 3) rise (revival); 4) peak (top of the cycle), and the periods for the existence of these phases may be different, depending on the specifics of the crisis.

At the beginning of the next cycle, in the recession phase, the most important is a prompt analysis of the upcoming crisis, based on several distinguishing factors, for example, the presence of negative economic growth rates for three consecutive quarters. As a consequence, the next step will be to develop operational solutions and plan ways to overcome the crisis.

The most problematic stage is reaching the bottom during the period of a deep depression of the entire national economic system, here the decisions made at the state level will have the most significant impact, ineffective use of both economic and political mechanisms of influence can lead to a protracted period of exit from this stage (Oliynyk, 2015; Prokopenko et al., 2019). It is at this stage that the most large-scale and authoritarian use of instruments of monetary and fiscal regulation is observed.

In the stage of recovery and revival of economic processes, traditionally the most effective is the return to the market of market assets nationalized or transferred in other forms to the state during a crisis. Such a return is carried out either in the way of privatization or through stock exchanges.

It should be noted that the state itself does not fully return to the initial (pre-crisis) state at all subsequent phases of the cycle, demonstrating the inertial phenomenon of sequential increment: the more profound the crisis, the greater the scale of the state's growth.

Awareness of the fact that the cyclical development of economic systems is a natural process allows us to consider economic crises from the standpoint of a dualistic nature – as a destructive process of destruction, on the one hand, and at the same time – as an opportunity to renew the entire economic system, on the other hand.

### **3.2 Political network alliances as a concentration of methods of applying political technologies.**

Dynamically developing modern socio-economic systems are increasingly intertwining scientific research in both the economic and political spheres. That is why, now more than ever before, it is becoming urgent and vital to research and apply political technologies in the spheres of counteracting systemic economic crises (Satalkina and Shpak, 2018). The nature of modern society dictates the need for the formation of new, adequate political and economic organizational forms of government.

The aggravating consequences of incorrect anti-crisis management at the state level, the bureaucratization of the political and economic structures of society, conservatism in the field of management activities of state institutions, lead to the need to search and implement new approaches in the field of anti-crisis management at the state level.

In this light, the so-called political network alliances – unique forms of political and organizational formations, which are a new round in the concept of using political technologies in economic systems of a national scale – acquire a particular role.


At their core, political network alliances are a way to use the synergistic effect of combining institutionally independent, state and non-state actors with common interests in a particular area of public policy. In general, this concept of political technologies reveals in a fundamentally different way the essence of the relationship between state and non-state institutions: from hierarchical, subordinate relations to a system of cooperation based on horizontal connections, equal statuses, network structures that exclude the use of coercive mechanisms and direct pressure. The areas of interest and responsibility of the alliance are outlined in Fig. 3.

Uniting into a political network alliance of interdependent state and non-state participants will inevitably raise the question of how to ensure the achievement of a common goal of overcoming the economic crisis, participants who represent different social sectors have their motivation and specific strategies for interacting with the environment, and most importantly - understand the public good differently? Discussions about accountability regimes for different types of participants lead to the conclusion that it is possible to ensure accountability of the alliance as a political and economic entity only if there is a consensus between the participants on mutual concessions - partial acceptance of each other's accountability models, which will create conditions for conflict-free progress towards achieving the goal of exiting the general crisis of each of them.

The nature and specificity of political network alliances are revealed through their fundamental characteristics.

1. Diversity of participants and their goals. Alliances consist of various types of participants, each of which pursues their own organizational objectives in interaction and at the same time maintains institutional independence. None of the participants initially occupies privileged positions that allow him to dictate conditions to others, and cannot foresee what the result will be in the end and how his priorities and goals can be transformed in the process of interaction.

**Figure 3.** Spheres of interests and responsibilities of the subjects of the political network alliance



Source: compiled by the authors

2. Resource interdependence of participants based on the need for access to additional resources to achieve the set goals. Resource interdependence is the primary stimulus for the formation of contacts between the participants, which subsequently develop into stable relationships.

3. The duration and duration of interactions between the members of the alliance, which makes it possible to form internal rules, norms of the interaction of participants, regulating behaviour, parameters of entry and participation in the network, principles of resource allocation, etc.

The political network alliance begins to form at the time of the emergence of interactions of several actors around the political and economic problem, requiring the pooling of resources and collective action to resolve it. The members of the alliance are representatives of individual independent subjects. Still, since in most situations they are representatives of the interests of certain socio-economic groups, then, accordingly, these groups can be considered as active elements of a political network alliance.

Participants differ not only by their belonging to different social sectors but also by organizing activities at various management levels: local, regional or national. Those who operate at the municipal level are limited by the problems and specifics of local politics. As a rule, this is a grassroots bureaucracy, small commercial and volunteer organizations, whose interaction is mainly based on horizontal and interpersonal relationships. The regional level is usually represented by the respective political elite and bureaucracy, larger business structures and various non-profit organizations. It is at this level that political alliances that are involved in the implementation of state sectoral policy operate, which are characterized by more complex ties between participants.

It should be noted that participation in an alliance does not always mean an opportunity for a participant to realize his interests. First of all, this concerns non-state actors, whose role can be limited exclusively to the transmission of the parts of a particular group, the same opportunity to voice a position on the issue. Still, they cannot have a significant influence on decision-making due to the latent, non-public opposition of the elite.

The asymmetry of the statuses of the alliance members is inevitable not only because of their inequality in resources but also because, as a rule, state institutions that inevitably have a particular position are involved in the interaction. Unlike other members of the alliance, state institutions are called upon to express the interests of the whole society, often to the detriment of the economic interests of other members of the coalition.

In the course of the implementation of the political network alliance, activities and the resolution of the economic crisis, the role of state institutions increases, since the state itself, despite any circumstances, cannot refuse to fulfil its essential obligations and withdraw from interaction, considering the decision of one or another problem are too complicated, costly or time-consuming.

The specific status of state institutions is also predetermined by the instruments of influence, which have both political and economic nature and are exclusively at their disposal – lawmaking, regulation, and legitimate coercion. At the same time, these tools presuppose a special regime for their use; therefore, in some cases, the state is forced to limit their use even to the detriment of obtaining apparent advantages. Moreover, the key motivation for government institutions is to maintain legitimacy, not minimize costs. As a result, the role of state institutions in network interaction is twofold: on the one hand, they act on an equal footing with other participants, seeking to maximize their interest, on the other hand, using a unique position, they can ensure that the most important goals and objectives of the alliance will be incorporated into the decision-making process (Ulset, 2008; Stieglitz, 2016). The scheme of interaction and types of participants in an abstract political network alliance is shown in Fig. 4.

The typology of possible participants in a political alliance can be defined in four main types (White, 2018):

"Players" – these participants, are distinguished by a high interest in solving the problem; they also have the most fantastic range of resources to overcome the crisis. As a rule, these are vital participants (stakeholders) who occupy strategic positions in the alliance. State institutions, representatives of the political elite, or large and medium-sized businesses are most often the "players".

"Actors" – participants with interest in contributing to the achievement of the goals of the network, but lacking resources. At the same time, such participants are of high value for the system, since their enthusiasm and activity can be supplemented, for example, by financial resources. This type of participants includes non-profit organizations, expert and academic organizations.

"Adjusters" – the most dangerous network participants, possessing resources but not interest. They can create serious problems for the functioning of the alliance, erecting barriers to interaction, causing communication gaps. Increasing the motivation of these participants, their interest in achieving a common goal, becomes a problematic management task, especially if the resources they have are irreplaceable or scarce—for example, competition between interest groups.


"Crowd" – participants who often have the utilitarian motivation, who want to get additional resources at their disposal, without having any interest in achieving the goals of the network, and therefore not investing resources in it. It is necessary to identify such participants and create conditions for their exclusion.

Another important characteristic that determines the specifics of the alliance's work is the political technologies used by the state concerning interest groups. To achieve their goals, state institutions can seriously influence the modification of the alliance by selecting specific members, which will inevitably determine the nature of relations within. In particular, we can talk about the following types of possible approaches of the state:

- 1) openness concerning private interests, allowing the formation of alliances at the initiative of representatives of society;
- 2) recognition of individual organized groups and granting them a privileged right of access to the decision-making process (creation of conciliation commissions and granting the right to participate in them to certain interested groups);
- 3) active support of special organized interest groups, providing them with exclusive access to the desired privileges;
- 4) creating private interest groups or changing their structure.

The mechanisms determine the logic of decision-making in a state at the political level for coordinating interests operating in it, reflecting the model of its interaction with society, the shell of state administration, and, of course, the political technologies used.

**Figure 4.** Types of participants and the scheme of the alliance



Source: compiled by the authors

### 3.3 The mechanism of the political network alliance in the field of resolving issues to overcome the economic crisis.

In general, the configuration of political network alliances created in the state at the political and managerial levels, the format of their interaction depend on the specifics of the ruling elite, the style of political leadership, the level of development of civil society, the level of the political activity of the population, the institutional architecture of the state and its effectiveness, and the professionalism of civil servants.


Achievement of the tasks set in the process of allying becomes possible due to the use of various types of political technologies as a feedback mechanism. Political instruments, in this case, can be perceived either as methods by which collective behaviour is structured, aimed at solving the problem of overcoming the crisis, or as methods of management, including the use of power resources or its conscious limitation, in any case, they will play a decisive role in operational activities of the entire alliance.

Political instruments can be supplied both at the "entry" and "exit" from the system. At the "entrance" they determine how power will be distributed in the alliance, how resource flows will be organized. In this case, we should talk about various types of government regulation used to achieve the set goals. Thus, economic law affects commercial and monetary activities and social regulation in the form of civil and criminal legislation to control or establish parameters of social behaviour aimed at achieving an appropriate economic effect.



Another type of political instruments – grants and contracts – are used when there is a need for targeted impact on specific members of the alliance. Taxes, loans, credit guarantees as political instruments determine financial flows within the structure being created.

**Figure 5.** Diagram of the tools used by the political network alliance to solve the assigned tasks



Source: compiled by the authors

At the "exit", political instruments are the result of a decision-making process submitted to the external environment and designed to regulate the behaviour of counterparties external to the alliance. For example, tools for economic, social and environmental regulation can be the result of networking between stakeholder groups and relevant government agencies, as well as the decision to issue grants to specific individuals or organizations, or the conclusion of contracts with external counterparties to transfer a particular function to outsourcing.

The very functioning of the network alliance, together with the range of political technologies and economic instruments available to it, is presented in Fig. 5.

The design of the future alliance begins with the formulation and correct answer to the vital question: what political and administrative goals the government department is trying to achieve, choosing between the hierarchical, market and network form of management of the latter. Even though the global goal is to overcome the economic crisis, nevertheless, the creation of such a complex structure pursues a more specific purpose, and the choice of this particular form of political technology should be logically justified.

Despite the simplicity and obviousness of this statement, in real practice, government administrations follow a different logic, using resources to eliminate the most prominent and socially significant problems, postponing effective long-term solutions in favour of populist ways to overcome crises.

The political network alliance, as a form of application of political technologies, can demonstrate its effectiveness only if it is used not for solving local problems, but for an integrated approach to overcoming the crisis achievement of the mission of the department.

The organization of the functioning of such a complex structure is a rather complicated process since it involves the unification of many participants, whose joint activities are designed to help the state overcome the crisis. As an effective strategy for uniting interested participants, one can consider the formation of a common communication space, involving a wide range of organizations, whose narrow specialized professional view of the problem will become an invaluable contribution to the general discussion and the search for strategies to overcome the economic crisis (Caratas et al., 2019). For example, non-profit organizations have a large stock of knowledge and experience in solving acute social problems. Still, they do not have sufficient resources for their dissemination and access to the process of developing government decisions to realize their interests.

The choice of the right partners is the essential prerequisite for the success of the further functioning of the alliance, its stability and economic stability, as well as a necessary condition for the correct development and implementation of the state anti-crisis strategy in general.

When designing an alliance, close attention should be paid to the creation and reproduction of communication channels between participants, without which the work of the entire structure is doomed to failure. At the present stage, strong ties cannot be established without the use of information technologies that allow accumulating data from all members of the alliance, promptly disseminating information between them, ensuring a high speed of information transfer, responsiveness to a situation, as well as communication at a distance in real-time.

#### **4. Experiment and analysis of results.**

The complexity of the formation of such political and economic structures, as a political network alliance, makes it challenging to conduct an experimental test of this methodology at the state level. Nevertheless, the practical application of such political management technologies takes place at the regional and municipal levels in the context of systemic economic crises over the past years.

The results of the analysis of the experience of developing crisis regions, within the framework of the general state program for overcoming the consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008-2011, allows us to consider the situation when regional authorities, under the pressure of crisis trends and with insufficient state support, are forced to look for ways to solve existing problems through cooperation with the private sector and the creation of autonomous network alliances.

The situation in the regions, as a result of the global financial crisis, led to a prolonged economic depression, which led to a decrease in economic indicators, an outflow of valuable personnel from the region, an increase in unemployment, a decrease in investment attractiveness and a credit rating.

An analysis of the problem showed that traditional forms of economic impact did not lead to the desired effects - federal tax incentives, government programs to stimulate employment, etc., led only to short-term results. The region temporarily raised the indicators of financial stability, but with the termination of state support, everything returned to square one, the area from once the primary donor of the state budget turned into a subsidized one.

In order to solve a comprehensive solution to the crisis problem with the organizational support of the state, a "round table" was organized at which the main steps and directions for solving existing problems were identified - this became the prototype for the creation of a political network alliance, which at the initial stage included both state institutions and private companies:

Political community – ruling party and opposition advisory council, state employment department, regional education department.


Professional network – regional office of the ministry of finance, state and local tax offices, a private business consulting firms, a community of commercial banks, an association of industrial enterprises.

Non-profit structures – ecological community, professional retraining centre, private employment companies.

Background structures – activists, media, international watchdogs, political lobbyists

The structure of this political and economic association is shown in Fig. 6; the diagram also indicates the roles that the participants performed in the specified education.

**Figure 6.** The structure and composition of the members of the political network alliance



Source: compiled by the authors

The alliance's policy was aimed at stabilizing the situation in the region; for this purpose, several anti-crisis measures were developed, the implementation of which was distributed among themselves by the alliance members. It is worth noting that the very format of the "round table", as well as the democratic foundations of statehood, allowed entities whose further usefulness in the implementation of anti-crisis measures was not obvious to enter the alliance, nevertheless the regional authorities did not have experience of creating such political and economic entities. Besides, the experience of state support showed that the traditional approach to authoritarian measures to overcome the crisis in this situation did not justify itself, therefore "the green light was given to the most liberal attitude to the policy of forming an alliance.

Political and economic instruments for overcoming the crisis were divided into several leading groups, in each of which the corresponding member of the alliance performed its role and task.

Anti-crisis measures within the framework of the reorganization of the region:

1) Strengthening social protection:

- Social assistance for unemployment
- Professional retraining programs for specialists
- The "affordable medicine" program

2) Support for city-forming enterprises:

- 1. The tax incentive program,
- 2. Programs of concessional lending,
- 3. Increasing the availability of financial resources,

3) General support of the real sector:

- A comprehensive plan for the conversion of unprofitable enterprises,
- Reducing administrative pressure on business,
- The program to reduce administrative barriers in business,
- State support for small and medium-sized businesses,
- Reorganization of the banking system

4) Reorganization of the regional budget:

- Grants to support budget-balancing measures
- A comprehensive audit of the expenditure side of the budget,

- The program for the redistribution of the share of tax deductions from the federal to the local budget.

The set of measures implemented by the political network alliance, unlike previous attempts at reorganization, did not presuppose dominant control by exclusively state institutions. Instead, this set of actions was based on the active involvement of both commercial and non-commercial private structures in the reorganization of the region.

The issues of social policy on reducing unemployment and re-profiling specialists were solved both at the expense of the state employment department, as well as private training centres and activists of public organizations. Over the three years of the retraining program implementation, based on public and private educational institutions, 3,784 specialists were retrained, which is 73% more than the same indicators when using only state programs. At the same time, it was revealed that the decrease in the number of unemployed after passing the retraining program was 82; more than in the implementation of the state program of the employment fund. Such high rates of decline in the number of unemployed were caused by the fact that state employment programs took into account the general pool of necessary specialists, without taking into account local specifics.

The rehabilitation programs of the city-forming enterprises affected 7 large mining complexes and 3 machine-building plants in the region. Due to the global financial crisis, these export-oriented enterprises lost their sales markets, so the main task within the alliance was to find ways to withdraw them from potential bankrupts, by partially redesigning them to produce alternative goods and focus on local sales markets.

The issues of the reorganization of the city-forming enterprises were the most difficult for the entire region and the created alliance, firstly, because the bankruptcy of any of these structures could have a cascading nature. Secondly, due to the nature of their activities, these enterprises are essential both economically and social significance. It was not possible to solve the problem in full, but out of 10 enterprises, 6 reached the break-even point, and 4 managed to increase production volumes to pre-crisis values.

The alliance's policy and measures taken to improve the region's recovery had a positive effect on the local budget, the excess of the revenue side over the expenditure side reached 7.8% versus -32% before the start of the alliance. It is worth noting that this was largely achieved due to the position of the state tax authorities, and the initiative of the advisory council of the ruling party and the opposition – their joint speech, made it possible to revise the share of taxes remaining at the regional level.

## **5. Conclusion.**

Systemic economic crises have become an integral part of modern economic systems; by their nature, crises simultaneously carry both threats and opportunities for any entities, both individual business units and states as a whole. Traditional anti-crisis measures based on considering them from a purely economic point of view have long ceased to exist. The economic crisis in modern realities is a problem and an opportunity that appears at the junction of economics, politics and the social sphere, which means that to overcome it successfully is not enough to use some tools or technologies alone. Modern anti-crisis measures must include a delicate balance between political levers of control and economic mechanisms of influence. The synergistic effect of the fusion of resources and capabilities of state institutions and the private sector can most clearly manifest itself in the implementation of the proposed approach to creating political network alliances.

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