Концепції нейтрального монізму та суб’єктивний характер свідомості

Abstract

Класичні теорії нейтрального монізму, що виникли на початку 20-го сторіччя у працях Е. Маха, В. Джеймса, Б. Рассела, пропонують тезу, згідно з якою те, що ми розуміємо як тілесне або розумове, є лише різними способами сприйняття єдиної нейтральної сутності. Незважаючи на здатність розв’язувати важливі метафізичні проблеми, зокрема проблему взаємодії ментального та фізичного, згадані доктрини не в змозі пояснити суб’єктивний характер нашої свідомості. Відтак, малоймовірною видається конструктивність даних концепцій для пояснення специфіки індивідуальної свідомості.

Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. Ernst Mach denies any value of individual consciousness, except exclusively practical. Max is forced to talk about impersonal or transpersonal contents of consciousness, along with the approval of uniform filling bodies and minds, claims panpsychism as the picture of the world. And, realizing this, Max does not resort to any particular explanation, and refers to the argument of critics Avenarius. And the theory of consciousness that arises on the basis of his claims also has many drawbacks: it does not explain either the presence of subjective experience nor its diversity (if I – the only combination of functional elements, it is unclear why so many nuances of human feelings). Consciousness of James did not matter and not a way of life, but external relations, the originality of our same feelings (subjective experience) arises not because of their consciousness, but because of the relationship between feelings that they themselves have experienced character. So impersonal consciousness, I and its manifestations are content to experience, and to be conscious, or claim that conscious – means nothing more than that some part of the experience "a witness." Russell also leaves unresolved the issue of mental subjectivity. Within its interpretation ego can not be solved, because in order to be perceived by us (something similar to be something for us), the events should belong to our part I, which provides some degree of unity I. And such remarks are relevant to all classical reduction theory of neutral monism. Indeed, any attempt to reduce consciousness to neutral elements as shown earlier, must involve loss of a subjective content phenomenal states Thus, despite the attractiveness of the ontological (minimum liability), epistemological acceptability (the ability to acquire knowledge about the "outside world"), the principle of economy of thought, the ability to avoid dualistic mindbody problem (the phenomenal properties are easily integrated with the material world), the classical theory of neutral monism can not and do not seek to explain our subjective experience: reduction in the subjective experience is not reduced to neutral, and disappears. Despite the attempt to withdraw from the ontological commitments of his neutral monism reducing installation procedure preserving the existence of a single reality whose two aspects are matter and consciousness, may be more successful, at least to explain consciousness